

**Stability-penalty-adaptive
follow-the-regularized-leader:
Sparsity, game-dependency, and best-of-both-worlds**




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Environment adaptivity in online learning and bandits

Consider regret minimization for given T rounds

- **Data-dependent bounds** in adversarial environments [Allenberg-Auer-Györfi-Ottucsák 2006]
 - ▶ Regret bounds exploiting the property of the underlying environment
 - ▶ e.g., First-order / second-order / path-length bounds



- **Best-of-both-worlds** [Bubeck & Slivkins 2012]

- ▶ Knowing if the environment is stochastic or adversarial in advance is challenging
- ▶ Aiming to achieve optimality in both stochastic and adversarial environments simultaneously
 - e.g., $O(\log T)$ in stochastic environments and $O(\sqrt{T})$ in adversarial environments for T rounds

Can we make FTRL more adaptive?

- **Follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL)** can achieve these environment adaptivity
- For FTRL with the Shannon entropy regularizer with learning rate $(\eta_t)_{t=1}^T$, a main part of the regret is bounded by $\mathbb{E} \left[\widehat{\text{Reg}}_T^{\text{SP}} \right]$ for

$$\widehat{\text{Reg}}_T^{\text{SP}} = \sum_{t=1}^T \left(\frac{1}{\eta_{t+1}} - \frac{1}{\eta_t} \right) \underbrace{h_{t+1}}_{\text{penalty}} + \sum_{t=1}^T \underbrace{\eta_t z_t}_{\text{stability}}$$

- Existing adaptive learning rates $(\eta_t)_{t=1}^T$ in FTRL depend **only** on the (empirical) penalty or stability terms
 - ▶ With **empirical** stability $(z_s)_{s=1}^{t-1}$ and **worst-case** penalty terms $h_{\max} \geq \max_{t \in [T]} h_t$, we get **data-dependent bounds** [McMahan 2011; Lattimore & Szepesvári 2020, and so many!]
 - ▶ With **empirical** penalty $(h_s)_{s=1}^{t-1}$ and **worst-case** stability $\bar{z} \geq \max_{t \in [T]} z_t$, we get **best-of-both-worlds** [Ito-Tsuchiya-Honda 2022, Tsuchiya-Ito-Honda 2023]

Q. Can we construct learning rates jointly dependent on the **empirical** stability and penalty?

Stability-penalty-adaptive (SPA) learning rate

Definition (informal)

A sequence of learning rates $(\eta_t)_{t=1}^T$ is **stability-penalty-adaptive (SPA) learning rate** if the update is written with a certain non-negative reals $((h_t, z_t, \bar{z}_t))_{t=1}^T$ as follows:

$$\beta_t = \frac{1}{\eta_t}, \quad \beta_1 > 0, \quad \beta_{t+1} = \beta_t + \frac{c_1 z_t}{\sqrt{c_2 + \bar{z}_t h_1 + \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} z_s h_{s+1}}}$$

update jointly dependent on stability z_s & penalty h_{s+1}

Theorem (informal)

Let $(\eta_t)_{t=1}^T$ be a SPA learning rate. Then under a certain condition on $((h_t, z_t, \bar{z}_t))_{t=1}^T$,

$$\widehat{\text{Reg}}_T^{\text{SP}} = \tilde{O} \left(\sqrt{c_2 + \bar{z}_t h_1 + \sum_{t=1}^T z_t h_{t+1}} \right)$$

regret bound jointly dependent on stability z_s & penalty h_{s+1}

- Q.** Can we simultaneously achieve BOBW and data-dependent bounds?
 → check in multi-armed bandits and partial monitoring

I. Sparsity and BOBW in multi-armed bandits

- Sparsity level of losses $\ell_1, \dots, \ell_T \in [0, 1]^k$ is defined as $s = \max_{t \in [T]} \|\ell_t\|_0 \leq k$
- Sparsity-dependent bounds: data-dependent bounds considering the sparsity level $s \ll k$
 - ▶ Lower bound: $\Omega(\sqrt{sT})$, Upper bound: $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{sT})$ [Kwon & Perchet 2016, Bubeck-Cohen-Li 2018]
- Appropriately setting the stability and penalty terms in SPA learning rate yields

with some important techniques

Theorem (informal)

Corrupted Stochastic Env.	$R_T = O\left(\frac{s \log(T) \log(kT)}{\Delta_{\min}} + \sqrt{\frac{Cs \log(T) \log(kT)}{\Delta_{\min}}}\right)$	best-of-both-worlds
Adversarial Env.	$R_T = O(\sqrt{sT \log(k) \log(T)})$	sparsity-dependent bound

2. Game-dependency and BOBW in partial monitoring

Hierarchical structure of problem classes

(Locally observable) partial monitoring

$$\text{Stoc. } O\left(\frac{c \log T}{\Delta}\right) \quad \text{Adv. } O\left(mk^{3/2}\sqrt{T}\right)$$

Multi-armed bandits

$$\text{Stoc. } O\left(\frac{k \log T}{\Delta}\right)$$

$$\text{Adv. } O\left(\sqrt{kT}\right)$$

Dynamic pricing

$$\text{Stoc. } O(\dots)$$

$$\text{Adv. } O(\dots)$$

Expert advice

Partial monitoring = a very general online decision-making problems
Tend to be pessimistic

Desirable to automatically achieve **regret** that depends on
the inherent difficulty of the problem being solved

→ **game-dependent bounds** [Lattimore & Szepesvári 2020]

Theorem (informal) For locally observable partial monitoring games,

$$\text{Adversarial Env. } R_T \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\sqrt{\sum_{t=1}^T V'_t \log(k) \log(1+T)} \right] + o(\log T)$$

V'_t, \bar{V} : variables dependent on problem's inherent difficulty

$$\text{Corrupted Stochastic Env. } R_T = O\left(\frac{r_{\mathcal{M}} \bar{V} \log(T) \log(kT)}{\Delta_{\min}} + \sqrt{\frac{Cr_{\mathcal{M}} \bar{V} \log(T) \log(kT)}{\Delta_{\min}}} \right) + o(\log T)$$

Summary

Learning rate jointly dependent on stability and penalty

The main term of regret upper bound of FTRL

$$\widehat{\text{Reg}}_T^{\text{SP}} = \sum_{t=1}^T \left(\frac{1}{\eta_{t+1}} - \frac{1}{\eta_t} \right) h_{t+1} + \lambda \sum_{t=1}^T \eta_t z_t \quad \text{for some } \lambda > 0$$

penalty stability

Stability-penalty-adaptive learning rate

$$\beta_{t+1} = \beta_t + \frac{c_1 z_t}{\sqrt{c_2 + \bar{z} h_1 + \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} z_s h_{s+1}}}$$

Regret bound jointly dependent on stability and penalty

$$\widehat{\text{Reg}}_T^{\text{SP}} = \tilde{O} \left(\sqrt{c_2 + \bar{z} h_1 + \sum_{t=1}^T z_t h_{t+1}} \right)$$

I. Multi-armed bandits

Sparsity-dependent bound and best-of-both-worlds guarantee

2. Partial monitoring

Game-dependent bound and best-of-both-worlds guarantee